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Summary
The countries in Central and Eastern improvement in profitability over this pe-Euirope must determine what policies will riod. most encourage enterprise restructuring, Privatization had a large impact on rewhich is essential for the transition to a structuring. On average, a firm that has been normal market economy and for accession privatized for four years will increase proto the European Union. Restructuring in-ductivity 3-5 times more than a similar firm volves shedding surplus labor, manufactur-that is still in state ownership. ing higher quality products, finding new We found little difference in productivmarkets in Western countries, and spinning ity between privatized firms in countries that off social and unneeded assets. used mass privatization methods (Czech and Privatization is
In this paper, we analyze the financial Slovak Republics, Poland) and in the other the key to restruc- and operating data (1992 to 1995) for more countries, which, until recently, have used turing. than 6,300 industrial firms in seven coun-standard (case-by-case) methods. In other tries of the region: Bulgaria, Czech Repub-words, either method of privatization for the lic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Re-same period of time will (on average) show public, and Slovenia. We compare the extent the same degree of restructuring. of restructuring across firms in these seven Based on an econometric analysis of countries to determine which country's Czech firms, we found that firms with conpolicies are most effective in encouraging centrated ownership have restructured more restructuring. All firms were previously than firms with dispersed ownership. Firms owned by the state and many still are. These with loans from and ownership ties to banks firms account for 40 to 95 percent of the restructured even more. This suggests that industrial employment in these countries.
banks may be able to better monitor the In our analysis we examined the follow-performance of managers and encourage ing measures of restructuring:
restructuring if they are both owners and * Profitability lenders to the firms. * Proportion of firms with a positive operat-There are two related policy questions ing cash flow, concerning the role of banks in the restruc-* Average operating cash flow as a percent turing of firms. The first question is whether of revenue, governments should recapitalize the large * Growth in labor productivity, banks (typically still state-owned) to com-G Growth in total factor productivity, and pensate for their bad loans. The second * Growth in exports.
question is whether banks should be encour-
The results were consistent for all six meas-aged to forgive (write-off) bad loans made ures. to firms. Enterprise managers often argue We next used econometric ana,lysis to that these two policies will allow them to identify the government policies that most restructure more easily.
Differentprivati-
encouraged firms to restructure. In this Our econometric analysis examined first zation methods analysis, we used as the measure of restruc-whether additional bank lending actually show similar returing the increase in total factor productiv-encourages restructuring. The results are suIts. ity (the increase in output relative to the mixed. In the early years of transition, addiincrease in all inputs).
tional bank lending in all countries except iAsetinoa inputs),ntial progress tOwrI for Hungary was actually associated with a Although substantial progress towards decline in subsequent productivity and profprofitability was made in five of the coun-declme is subst thatuctivityans wre tries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland itability. This suggests that bank loans were trieSlovak ch Republic, and Hungary, Pola, f not helping to restructure firms but were Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), thie firms financing their losses. By 1995, however, are not as profitable as those in a developed banks in five out of the seven countries market economy (in which typically 95 per-seemed to be making more sound lending cent of the firms are profitable). In contrast, firms in Bulgaria and Romania showed little decisions and supporting restructuring. The
We also found that the amount of bad exceptions were Bulgaria and Romania. loans and thus the need to recapitalize the When we divided the sample into privat-banks is declining in those countries with ized and state-owned firms, it turned out that rapid restructuring. We estimated the ability poor bank lending was associated with state-of firms in our data set to repay their bank owned firms. In all countries banks make loans based on their operating cash flow. sound lending decisions for privatized firms, We conclude that recapitalizing banks but continued to support ailing state firms. and encouraging them to forgive loans is We next examined firms burdened by unlikely to help firms restructure very much. large loans from banks that they cannot
In fact, poor bank lending practices may currently repay. We found that high levels discourage restructuring and result in addi-
Imprudent bank
of indebtedness at the start of transition did tional bad loans. A safer course of action is lending is mostly not hinder restructuring. One reason is that to recapitalize banks only at the time of their to state-owned such firms may be under greater pressure to privatization and after a large share of enfrms restructure. Another related reason is that terprises are privatized. That way there is firms in the region seem to be ingenious at more certainty that new bank owners will finding sources other than loans from banks improve the quality of lending, support reto finance restructuring. These sources may structuring, and avoid another increase in include loans from new private banks, cred-bad loans. its from foreign buyers, new equity, joint ventures, and, most importantly, the firm's own cash flow.
Introduction
Only through improvements in firm define what restructuring means and give productivity and profitability will there be examples from interviews with 21 firms in an increase in the overall standard of living the Slovak Republic. We then examine the in transition economies. One of the most change in firm profitability in these seven important tasks in the transition to a market countries over the period 1992 to 1995. In economy is the restructuring of formerly addition to profitability, we use five other state-owned firms. This restructuring can be measures to determine which firms have thought of as the initial transition from a restructured the most. highly distorted economy with many large Next, we use econometric analysis to loss-making firms to a normal market econ-determine which government polices most omy in which most firms are profitable. encourage restructuring. These policies in-Restructuring is also a precondition for clude speed of privatization, allocation of accession to the European Union, which is bank lending, and reduction of indebtedness. an objective of many countries in Central Finally, we examine the impact of bank and Eastern Europe. Firms in these countries lending on restructuring and the link bemust be able to compete with EU firms tween industrial restructuring and the health without the need for subsidies or excessive of the banking system. risk of bankruptcy and loss of employment.
Restructuring of firms is also closely What is industrial restructuring? linked to the health of the banking system.
Operational restructuring of firms means
Restructuring is a complex process. that they can pay a larger share of their bank Firms in all countries must continuously loans and thus limit the bad loans held by restructure to maintain profitability in the banks. This may lessen or even eliminate the face of a changing economic environment, need to recapitalize the state-owned banks technological progress, and competition through government-led programs. Healthy from other firms. This continual restructurfirrms are a condition for a healthy financial ing leads to higher productivity and ecosystem. nomic growth. We have obtained data on the perform-In the early years of the transition to a ance of industrial firms in seven countries of market economy, firms in Central and Eastthe region (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hun-em Europe experienced severe demand and gary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, price shocks. Demand for their products and Slovenia). These countries have adopted from former socialist countries had declined, different policies to encourage restructuring; and they were forced to find new markets in thus these data can suggest which policies Western countries with higher quality stanhave been the most successful. In this paper, dards. Lowered trade barriers meant that Restructurig we summarize and extend our recent re-they faced increased competition from im-should be a consearch using data for 1992-1995,1 and we ported products in their home markets. Fi-shous proceson update our earlier study that was based on nally, all countries experienced severe ecosimilar data for 1992-1994.2 nomic recession which led to lower domes-We analyze a number of important is-tic demand. sues concerning restructuring. First, we
As a consequence of these shocks, many firms in the region became unprofitable. In I This includes Claessens et al. (1997a) , Claessens et some cases, their situation was so desperate al. (1997b), Djankov and Pohl (1997) , and Djankov that their sales revenue was not even adeand Hoekman (1997). quate to pay their suppliers. They were 2 The original study, Pohl et al. (1996) was based on classified as "value subtractors" because the firm-level data for Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak market value of their production was less Republics, Hungary, and Poland. than the cost of the materials used. If these firms could not restructure their operations, large, mostly troubled firms in the Slovak
Spinning off social and unneeded
Republic operating in a wide variety of inassets -Most firms transferred to local dustries. 3 governments such assets as housing, The extent of restructuring in these recreational facilities, and cafeterias; firms was substantial. In the early years of and they sold assets no longer needed transition, two-thirds had been large loss-such as inventories and surplus equipmakers and one-third were judged by manment and machinery.
agement consulting firns to be nonviable. 4. New Westem markets --In 1991, By the end of 1996, however, over two-only 9 percent of output was sold to thirds of them were profitable including Western countries. By 1996, the output one-half of the firms judged nonviable.
had increased to 47percent. Generally
In the early years of transition, the sales this occurred because the Slovak firm renethes eal herse ofirms transit uth sals had become a supplier or subcontractor revenues of these firms dropped; but byv oaWsenfr ahrta eln 1996,reveues (n costantdollrs) ha to a Westem firm rather than selling 1996, revenues (in constant dollars) had directly to final consumers. increased to the level of 1991. This suggests 5.rew poducts uaiire that managers had found new markets to New -Ioderto a supprto ment --In order to become a supplier to take the place of those in former socialist a Westem firm, the Slovak firms had to countries. Labor productivity (measured by change their product mix and improve value added per worker) almost doubled quality standards. For example, twofrom 1991 to 1996. Most of these firms had thirds of the firms have obtained an ISO domestic owners (the majority of which 9001 certificate for total quality assurwere current or former managers) and re-ance. ceived little foreign investment.
The examples from the Slovak Republic owned firms that must restructure. These (Box 1) illustrate what a firm must do to firms must rely on their own skills and rerestructure and thus return to profitability. sources.
The majority of managers and new owners
This is not to minimize the value of were able to restructure their firms without foreign investment and the advice from large amounts of foreign investment, foreign Western management experts. Foreign inmanagement expertise, loans from statevestors often bring skills that are in short owned banks, or government assistance. supply in transition economies (e.g., market-This is encouraging because outside assising skills). Previous studies show, however, tance is unlikely to be available in large that foreign investors are usually attracted to amounts for the thousands of former statefirms with considerable market power that have already restructured. 4 It would be a mistake, then, for managers to rely on out-Sample of firms side assistance that may not be available. 5 We measure the speed of restructuring 4 See Carlin et al. (1995) for a survey.
using financial statements and operating information from a large sample of indus-
The number of firms in the sample for were dropped from the original sample if data for some years were missing. 6
Hungary 241
The proportion of firms in each indus-trial subsector is similar from country to Poland 820
Our data set incountry. In most countries, there is a concludes most centration of firms in food, textiles, chemi- cal machinery. The size of a typical firm in terms of employment differs somewhat from country from country to country. 7 We also focused to country with the largest firms found in on measures of restructuring that incorpo-Poland and Romania (Figure 1 ). This is not rate the most reliable elements of the data. surprising since these countries have the For example, we emphasize comparisons of largest economies. The average size of operating cash flow (sales revenue less cost manufacturing firms in the region at the start of inputs and wages). This measure does not of the transition was higher than in devel-into take account depreciation, debt service, oped market economies, but this was due to and taxes, which are more likely to differ the absence of small firms rather than the from country to country because of historipredominance of very large firms. Very cal circumstances, differences in tax laws, or large firms account for a larger share of accounting standards. manufacturing and employment in developed market economies than in the transi-Measures of profitability tion economies.
In making comparisons between coun-The long term objective of restructuring tries, it is important that the accounting and is to improve the level of profitability of financial data for firms be based on similar firms to a level similar to mature market Data were adstandards. We adjusted the data to reflect economies in which almost all firms are justed to be com- 6 This exclusion of firms from the sample for lack of Polish firms in 1995 are used to illusdata appeared to be random, and not to introduce a trate this categorization ( Table 2 ). The catesignificant bias. The sample would be biased if the dropped firms were primarily the worst performers; for example, large loss makers that ceased to function 7 The main adjustments to the data were to reflect or were liquidated. If this is important, it may overes-changes in the accounting for inventories (early in the timate the extent of aggregate restructuring in Bul-period, increases in inventory was counted as a sale), garia, Hungary, and Poland where (relatively) more and the fact that government subsidies were recorded firms were excluded from the sample.
as sales.
gories of profit or loss range from category ciation of the existing assets. This is not a A firms, which are profitable (after taxes) by payment to anyone else but reflects the fact international accounting standards, to cate-that revenue is not adequate to maintain the gory E firms, which are value subtractors. level of productive capital. (Table 2 shows The categories are ranked based on the pri-that 221 firms are in this category because ority of paying expenses. they have a negative income before tax.) * Category E firms do not earn enough * Category A firms can pay all of their revenue to even cover the cost of material costs, debt service, depreciation, taxes, and inputs much less pay any of the other operatstill have revenue left over. (Table 2 shows ing costs. (Table 2 shows that 15 firms in that 574 firms are in this category because this category have a negative operating they have a positive net income after tax.) margin.)
Comparing the number of firms in Cate-Firms were cate-* Category D firms can pay their suppligory A for various countries (Table 3) , the gorized according ers but cannot pay all of their workers. Czech Republic and Hungary had the high-to degree ofprofit ( Table 2 shows that 126 firms are in this est percentage of profitable firms (74 peror loss. category because they have a negative op-cent and 70 percent respectively) and Roerating cash flow.) mania and Bulgaria the lowest. In almost all * Category C firms can pay all of their countries, the profitability of firms has imworkers and suppliers but cannot service all proved significantly (Table 3 ). of their debts;, for example, they are behind But there is also a great deal of variabilin their interest payments to banks. (Table 2 lty in performance. Some firms show an improvement in their profitability while shows that 13 firms are inthis categor others show a decline. This variability is because they have a negative cash flow after itra in a "transiTio marixfPlis debt service.) illustrated in a "transition matrix" for Polish * Category frms have enugh revenue firms (Table 4) . Each row of numbers shows * (Category B firmns have enough revenue wvhich firms in a particular category in 1992 to cover all of their costs except for depre-moved to anothe r category in 1995 moved to another category in 1995 or stayed in the same category. Both the number of improvement and remained Category E firms and a percentage of the total is pro-firms. At the opposite end, the profitability vided. of some firms in Category A in 1992 de-Using Category E firms (the worst per-clined over the period. Of the 498 profitable forming firms) as an example, this matrix (Category A) firms in 1992, 333 firms (67 shows that 31 out of the 72 firms in this percent) remained profitable. The other 165 category in 1992 (43 percent) became prof-firms, however, became unprofitable and itable and moved into Category A by 1995. moved into the other four categories. Two of In contrast, 6 firms (8 percent) showed no the profitable firmns in 1992 actually moved into the worst loss-making category Thus the first measure of restructuring is the (Category E).8 percentage of firms (weighted by employ-Of the total 1,066 firms, 835 showed an ment) that have achieved at least a positive improvement or stayed the same while 231 operating cash flow. This is defined to be showed a decline. In comparing these matri-sales revenue less cost of inputs and wages. ces from one country to another, a matrix In Table 3 , this would include all firms in with the largest numbers at or below the profit Categories A, B, and C. Conversely, diagonal (shaded area in Table 4 ) means that this measure also indicates the proportion of firms in that country are restructuring the firms in each country that are still large lossmost. In examining a similar matrix for makers. Once a firm has at least achieved firms in a developed market economy this level of profitability, it can use its op-(United Kingdom), we found most loss-erating cash flow to service some of its debt making firms improved or ceased operating. and invest in modernization and growth. * Operating cashflow. Although the first is defined as value added (value of sales less cost of non-labor inputs measured in 1995 Restructurin g willors bt ianfenc by con-prices) divided by the man-hours of labor many random factors that cannot be con-mI d trolled, including quality of management, employed. location, initial conditions, sector, or just * Total Factor Productivity. This measplain luck. The large variation suggests that ures the success of a firm in increasing the although governments can put policies that productivity of all factors of production encourage restructuring in place, not all (labor, material inputs, and capital). In esfirms will show equal improvement.
sence, an increase in total factor productivity occurs when output increases more than
Measures of restructuring the inputs increase. Because multiple inputs are involved, however, this measurement In addition to profitability, we have used has to be made using sophisticated statistical five other measures of restructuring: techniques. A companion paper explains the Positive operating cash flow. A com-techniques used. 9 mon problem in the early days of transition was that many firms were large loss-makers. 8 The percentages in Table 4 are not identical to those 9 The measurement of both labor productivity and in Table 3 for Poland because the percentages in the total factor productivity are further described in Claesearlier table are weighted by employment.
sens et al. (1997b) .
* Growth in exports. The firms in the * Rapid privatization. A firm would be region typically experienced a large decline either given away to all citizens (referred to in sales to their traditional markets in the as "coupon privatization" or "mass privatiformer socialist countries. Thus an essential zation") or go through management buyelement of restructuring was to reorient outs. sales to Western markets. This required . Concentrated outside control over firms. firms to develop more sophisticated market-After the coupon privatization period ining techniques and to improve the quality of vestment funds controlled by the banks betheir products so that they could compete came the dominant owners of many firms in with Western companies producing the the Czech and Slovak Republics. In other same products. The success of firms in re-countries such as Hungary, Poland, and AM the restructurorienting their sales to Western markets is Slovenia, many management/employee buying measures measured by the increase in exports from outs took place. Finally, in Hungary and
show similar re-1992 to 1995. more recently in the Czech Republic and uSM&.
For a given firm, the five restructuring Poland, some firms were bought by strategic measures tend to be highly correlated, but foreign investors. there are substantial differences in the pace . Limiting wage increases. Once a firm of restructuring across firms in the region restructures and improves its cash flow, ( Table 5 ). Czech firms rank at the top using wage increases must be limited so that there most measures of restructuring. Hungarian, g Polish, and Slovak firms are close behind and further restructuringa Firms in Bulgaria and Romania rank at the andnurhe rescturing. boottom. Analyzing differences in enterprise -Financial discipline. A firm is more perform.Ancacross thffrese c nteriesema likely to restructure if neither the governperformance across thlese countries may mn truhsbiis o h ak shed light on which policies most favor ment (through subsidies) nor the banks restructuring.
(through loans) finance the firm's losses. This financial discipline (sometimes referred Determinants of restructuring to as a "hard budget constraint") forces firms to achieve at least a positive operating Now we examine how the economic cash flow. policies in those countries with the most * Maintaining debt obligations. Firms restructuring differ from those countries may have a greater incentive to restructure with the least restructuring. Some of the and thus service their debts if banks do not economic policies that appear to be posiforgive or reduce those debts. tively correlated with restructuring include:
Although they are important, the poli- cies we describe here are not solely respon-In Table 6 we include estimates of the sible for rapid restructuring. extent of privatization in the seven coun-Our database on large industrial firms in tries. Because of the complexities in measurthe region allows us to measure which fac-ing the extent of privatization, the various tors most influence restructuring in all seven measures are not always comparable across countries. To more accurately determine countries, but they all show similar rankwhich economic policies allow for faster ings. We have also measured the extent of restructuring, we applied econometric privatization for those firms in our data analysis to the data (see Annex). This allows base. We define as "privatized" any firm us to separate the various government poli-that has more than 33 percent of its shares cies from the other factors including size, transferred to private investors (Table 6 , last sector, and initial level of productivity that two columns). We measure the extent of also have an impact on restructuring. We privatization both by a simple count of the summarize the results in the following sec-number of firms classified as privatized and tions.
a weighted average based on output to reflect differences in size.
Extent of privatization
On all measures the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic were Measuring the extent of privatization in ahead of the other four countries. At the a country is complicated, and cross-country opposite end, Bulgaria was almost comcomparisons are difficult. Does the measure pletely dominated by state-owned firms.
Privatization is
of privatization just count the number of the key to restrucfirms that have been privatized or does it Impact of privatization turing. take into account their size and importance? What firms are covered by the measure of The impact of privatization on restrucprivatization --small firms, only medium turing is very large. As shown in Table 7 , and large firms, industrial firms, agricultural labor productivity growth during 1992-95 firms, utilities, or banks? When is a firm averaged 7.2 percent per year, for privatized considered to be privatized --when owner-firmslO, but -0.3 percent for state-owned ship is completely in private hands (100 firms. In other words, privatization accounts percent), only a majority ownership (51 percent), or merely a significant minority ownership (say 25 percent)?
10 Firms are taken as privatized if more than one third of their shares were in private hands by 1995.
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Annex ( for 70 to 90 percent of the labor productivity other state-owned firms, even though they for70 o 9 pecen ofthelabr podutlvty were not formally privatized until November growth observed in countries with large 1995 One e pla ation frthi ithtmanprivatization programs. The exception is Hungary, where state-owned firms achieve agers improve their performance when they hungary, where state-owned firms achieve expect to be held accountable by new ownhalf the productivity gains of privatized eradwt to prove theirnablity as manfinn. B conras, incoutrie wih inigers and want to prove their ability as managfirms. By . contras , in countries with insig-ers before privatization. Similarly, large nificant privatization (e.g., Bulgaria and privatization programs appear to have a Romania), productivity in state-owned firms positive impact on productivity in stateis deteriorating.
owned firms, probably due to similar antici-Similar results were obtained if total pation and signaling effects. factor productivity (TFP) is taken as an indicator of restructuring. Figure 2 shows the Concentrated control over firms cumulative increase in total factor productivity for privatized firms since the time of Experts and government officials often privatization and compares this with the argue, that the quality of privatization TFP gains for state-owned firms in the should not be sacrificed for the speed of sample. The econometric analysis in the privatization. This was the justification mania is revising and continuing its earlier program.
If the arguments in favor of case-bycase privatization were valid, the economet-ric analysis would show that case-by-case privatization of a firm has a bigger impact Box 2: Mass Privatization in the Czech on their restructuring; i.e., the regression Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria coefficients for the privatization variable Mass privatization involves giving away would be smaller for mass privatized firms.
ownership of state-owned firms to all citizens. Such a premise is not supported by the data.
The Czech Republic pioneered this method in Mass privatization seems to result in the 1991 and had privatized more than 1,600 same speed of restructuring as other methfirms by 1994 in two waves (the Slovak Reods.
public only conducted the first wave). In some One explanation is that mass privatizacases, a portion of a firm's shares were retion did not result in dispersed ownership by served for sale using conventional methods. . * .~~~~~~~~A citizen was given (for a nominal charge) a many small investors. The structure of own-A .
Mass privatiza-
coupon, which could be used to buy shares In
Masritz-
ership became concentrated, often in the a national auction in any firm included in the tion encourages hands of large investment funds or succesprogram.
restructuring as sor holding companies. In the Czech Re-Citizens could bid to buy shares with much as other public, for example, ownership concentratheir coupons in any of the firms. Altema-
methods.
tion (measured by the share of the company tively, they could decide to turn over their owned by the five largest owners) was alcoupons to an investment fund and thus ready high by 1993 and has increased subbecome part owner of a much larger and stantially since then. Ownership concentradiversified portfolio. Almost anyone could tion is even higher in the Slovak Republic establish a fund. About 70 percent of the (Table 8 ). In the Polish mass privatization coupons were turned over to 550 funds, scheme, the ownership by investment funds which became the dominant owners of Czech was high by design. In each of the mass firms. privatized firms, 60 percent of all shares
In Poland, about 512 firms (representing were given to the fifteen investment funds.
only about 10 percent of all industry and construction in terms of sales) were recently mass privatized. In contrast to the Czech 
ing.
having small minority stakes in many comproximately 1,050 firms are included. About panies, these new holding companies have 80 percent of the citizens have turned their large majority stakes in just a few compacoupons over to approximately 100 investnies. The managers of the funds stated that ment funds. In contrast to the Czech prothey wanted to be the dominant majority gram, the government is retaining a majority shareholder in fewer firms. 1 l stake in many of the larger that are firms for sale using conventional methods. Thus, given the slow pace of conventional methods thus 11 Interviews with investment fund managers in the far and the current troubled economic situa-Czech Republic (March 1997) and Slovak Republic tion, privatization is likely to remain slow. (December 1996) . bank may also have better information about the operations of firms when it is both a lender and an owner, thus improving its ability to monitor the performance of firm In 1996, there appears to have been management. further concentration of ownership in the We find that both concentrated owner-Czech and Slovak Republics through merg-ship and ownership by bank-controlled ers, acquisitions, and buyouts. This is some-funds encouraged restructuring in the Czech times called the "third wave" of privatiza-Republic. In this analysis, the measure of tion. In the Slovak Republic, for example, restructuring is the value that the stock martwelve of the former foreign trade compa-ket places on the company relative to the nies have become holding companies with book value of its assets (this ratio is called large ownership stakes in 146 industrial "Tobin's Q"). 14 In other words, if investors firms. 12 believe that the company is restructuring A concentration of fund ownership and becoming profitable, they will bid up parallel to the concentration of firm owner-the prices of shares on the stock exchange. ship allows this transformation of invest-In our case, we are using investor's judgment funds into holding companies. Large ment about the extent of restructuring. investors have bought the shares of the As shown in Figure 4 , the stock market funds on the stock markets, accumulated places a higher value on a company in the controlling stakes, and then --at a general Czech Republic when ownership is more meeting of fund shareholders --approved a concentrated. 15 The value is increased furconversion of the fund into a holding com-ther if ownership is in the hands of bankpany.
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controlled funds and increased further still if Many of these fumds and holding com-these banks are also the main lenders to the panies in the Czech and Slovak Republics company. Although conflicts of interest may are controlled by large domestic banks exist between the role of a bank as both Many investment (Figure 3) . These banks own the manage-owner and lender to a company, investors funds have bement companies that established and now seem to believe that this is outweighed by come holding control the larger funds. There is concern the ability of the bank to monitor and con-
companies.
that these banks both lend to firms and con-trol the managers and thus encourage more trol the funds that own those firms. This restructuring. dual role could present conflicts of interest that might impair restructuring. 13 (1996) . Inter-15 This relationship breaks down when a single invesviews with the five largest bank-sponsored investment tor has more than 50% of the shares of a firm. This is funds by the authors (March 1997) showed that two of due to the weak minority shareholder protection in the the funds maintained strong links with their bank-Czech Republic. For earlier results see Claessens sponsor, while the other three acted independently.
(1997).
Figure 4: Impact of ownership concen-
Hungary (see Figure 5 ). Instead, firms were tration and bank ownership on stock more often sold to local domestic investors, restructuring depending on the expertise, skills, and independence of the banks mak-Five owner concentration ratio.
ing the loans.
Additional lending will encourage restructuring if the banks are skilled at evaluating the future performance of the Another explanation for the relatively companies that wish to borrow money. The high level of restructuring in those countries banks must be able to determine whether the that used mass privatization is that conven-firm managers will use the money to make tional case-by-case privatization did not profitable investments that help to restrucresult in higher quality owners that many ture the firm. Only then can the banks be had hoped for. Though detailed information confident that the firm will generate the on new owners is difficult to obtain, the necessary revenue to repay the loans. level of foreign participation in case-by-case Additional lending will discourage remethods has been relatively low except for structuring if the banks lend money to firms that will only use it to cover current operating losses (for example, wages) instead of reduced credit expansion so that banks have less to lend to loss-making firms. Second, government officials have also learned that failed to restructure, and many banks are pressuring banks to lend for the purpose of insolvent because they continued to make covering firm losses and avoid worker lay-bad loans to these firms. off cannot continue without jeopardizing When we divided the sample into privatmacro-stability and quality of lending. ized and state-owned firms, the results show Third, the banks themselves have improved that poor bank lending is largely associated their skills and can better evaluate the re-with state-owned firms. In all countries, structuring plans of firms before lending to banks made much better decisions in lendthem.
ing to private firms than to state owned As a result, the state-owned banks in firms. Lending to privatized firms was asthese countries have not increased their sociated with an increase in productivity bank lending has come from new private of the productivity gains as higher wages. banks. Outstanding loans by state-owned As noted above, firms must finance a large banks has shown little increase. Although proportion of investment with retained this is sometimes viewed with concern --earnings from current cash flow especially especially by firms who have traditionally when the financial system is weak. If wages borrowed from these state-owned banks --rise slower than labor productivity, more this is probably desirable until the state-cash flow is available for investment. Put owned banks can improve their lending differently, a positive operating cash flow skills and become more independent.
per worker only exists if labor productivity Our econometric analysisl 6 supports (value added per worker) exceeds wages. In this view of the evolution of bank lending. the long run, the objective is to increase Early in the transition, bank lending did wages so that the workforce benefits from more harm than good. In 1993, for six of the the restructuring of firms. In the short run, seven countries we examined, an increase in however, wage increases may have to be bank lending to a firm was associated with sacrificed to encourage faster restructuring. either constant or declining productivity Our analysis shows that the large pro-(Hungary was the exception). Two years ductivity gains from privatization have been later, however, the quality of bank lending Figure 6 : Labor productivity and real had improved in three more countries wage growth for privatized and state-(Czech and Slovak Republics, and Slove-owned firms (% p.a.) nia). Thus by 1995, in four out of the seven Labor productivit ty countries an increase in bank lending was associated with an increase (with a time lag) Bulgara garia. Many firms are still loss-makers be-* 0SIk
firms, labor pro-
Rep.
cause they were not privatized and have l -5 0 5 10 15
16 Claessens et al. (1997b) . pnvatiized linns ostate-owned fims largely retained by firms to finance produc-held to a level below labor productivity. If tivity-enhancing investments. For privatized labor productivity is increasing, wages can firms, labor productivity growth has been increase without impairing operating cash faster than real wage growth in all countries flow as long as they do not increase faster (above the diagonal in Figure 6 ). In contrast, than labor productivity. real wage growth in state-owned enterprises has exceeded labor productivity gains, Financial restructuring eroding internally generated financing.
The rapid productivity growth in privat-In addition to operational restructuring, ized firms has led to rapid growth in real many firms in the region need financial wages. But since privatized finms main-restructuring. These are firms that cannot tained a larger margin between labor pro-service all of their outstanding debts; they Government wage ductivity and wage, they were also able to are technically bankrupt or insolvent. It is policies have been sustain high levels of investment per worker important to determine when and how this less successful (Table 9) .
financial restructuring should take place.
than privatiza-
There are close links between opera-tion. tional and financial restructuring. One link is TUS$ableu9: Ivesmen perchasing worer parity, that rapid operational restructuring will im- to compensate the lender for the decline in value of in the state sector, but real wages still out-the loan. The high interest payment is partly a repaystripped productivity in contrast to the pri-ment of the loan principal. In effect, high interest rates vate sector.
force firms to rapidly repay a sizable proportion of A policy of limiting wages to encourage their outstanding loans in addition to the interest on investment does not mean than wages must the loans. Thus it is possible, for example, that the be constant. What matters is that they be financial situation of Bulgarian and Romanian firms is not as bad as portrayed in Figure 7 . could lead to relaxing the financial disci-0% -. pline on firms (hard budget constraint) that 1 0% ~10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% L_________ 1X___20__ 30__ 40______6____7___ has finally been achieved in most countries of the region. agree to forgive (write off) some debts in It should also be pointed out that firms exchange for this restructuring of the firm's in Western countries rely mostly on internal operations. Second, if the firm has little cash flow (retained earnings) to finance chance of achieving a positive operating working capital or new investments rather cash flow, the only alternative is liquidation: than bank loans (see Table 10 ). In contrast, The firm ceases to operate, employees are firms in the former socialist economies relaid off, and its assets are sold to pay at least lied heavily on loans from state-owned some of its debts. banks and they now complain when this Although a well functioning bankruptcy level of financing is no longer possible. system is essential, most financial restructur-Firms in the region, like their Western ing of firms do not occur through the formal counterparts, must learn to finance their bankruptcy system. In Western countries, a investments through increasing their own high percentage of financial restructurings cash flow. occur through voluntary negotiations between lenders and the firm. Only if the firm 
Bulgaria and
In Western countries, most financial restruc-
Romania. turing takes place through negotiations be-
tween private lenders (mostly banks) and private firms. However, in transition Early in the transition process, the level economies, most of the banks and many of firm indebtedness varied considerably firms are still state-owned. from country to country due in part to the On the one hand, delay in financial re-often ad-hoc nature of allocating investstructuring may hinder operational restructuring. An over-indebted firm that could become profitable may not be able to bor-ments under central planning. The ratio of Figure 8 : Ratio of total bank debt to sales bank debt to sales (see Figure 8 ) for the for industrial firms (1992) industrial firms in our sample was high in the two countries in which firms have re-Bulgaria 8 % structured the least (Bulgaria and Romania) and high in the two countries with signifi- structuring.
gests that a high level of initial iindebtedness
either has no effect or actually encourages _______20%_ 30%_____ operational restructuring; i.e., the coefficients for indebtedness in the regression Negotiated financial restructurings, equation were either insignificant or posi-however, do not eliminate the need for a tive. well functioning bankruptcy system to deal This conclusion is supported by the case with those firms that must be liquidated. 19 studies in the Slovak Republic. Most of Also banks may need to use the threat of these firms were highly indebted and thus swift bankruptcy and liquidation in order to had difficulty borrowing additional funds force reluctant firms to undertake a negotifrom the large Slovak state-owned banks. In ated financial restructuring. A good Commany cases, they found alternative sources mercial Code is also necessary. of finance, most importantly, their own internal cash flow. They had to undertake Impact on bank restructuring some restructuring to improve their cash flow, which was then used to finance further Although restructuring of firms is the restructuring. In addition to internal cash primary subject of this paper, countries of flow, these firms were able to obtain some the region also have to develop policies for outside financing from customers, from the privatization, restructuring, and recapiforeign and domestic private banks, and talization of the former state-owned banks. through new joint venture arrangements that Even with good progress in enterprise rewere not burdened with past debts. structuring, many banks may end up bur-On balance, special government policies dened with loans made to firms unable to to encourage the financial restructuring of service those loans, i.e., pay interest or re-In western counfirms may not be necessary. Financial re-pay the principal when due. Consequently, tries, internal structuring can wait until after banks have some banks may not be able to repay their cash flow is the been privatized and have developed the depositors and other liabilities. necessary negotiating skills and incentives.
If the government adopts policies that largest source of These banks have little to lose by not forgiv-encourage restructuring, firms will be able finance. ing debt and much to gain if the firms can to repay more of their bank loans. This will restructure, become more profitable, and reduce the need to recapitalize the banking repay more of their debt. A government system and the consequent burden on tax sponsored program to encourage banks to payers. Enterprise restructuring is thus necforgive firm debt may actually slow down essary to improve the health of the banking restructuring because it would weaken financial discipline. system. Nevertheless, some recapitalization Figure 9 : Bad loan ratio for industrial may be needed eventually for some banks.
firms Another difficulty is how to predict the '_ _ _ present discounted value of this cash flow assuming that it grows at a real rate of 4 38 percent in 1992 to 12 percent in 1995. In percent per year thereafter. 2 0 The real dis-contrast, the Bad Loan Ratio started higher count rate used is 9 percent. This is an esti-in Bulgaria and has only declined slightly. mate of the real lending rate charged by Although based on reasonable assumpbanks in the region. 2 1 We call this dis-tions, our estimate of the Bad Loan Ratio for counted value the Debt Repayment Capacity 1992 is high because operating cash flow for each firm. If it is less than the outstand-has grown faster than our assumption of 4 ing liabilities of the firm (bank loans, tax percent per year. Similarly, our estimate for arrears, accounts payable less accounts re-1995 is too high because firms in the region ceivable, etc.), the firm cannot repay all of continue their rapid pace of restructuring. its liabilities unless it restructures so as to Conventional methods for estimating the improve its operating cash flow. We refer to bad loans of banks fail to recognize the this shortfall as the Uncollectable Liabilities rapid rate of restructuring in some countries for each firm. and they overestimate the financial difficulty Once the Uncollectable Liabilities of of banks and the cost of their recapitalizaeach firm is calculated, we sum over all tion. firms and divide by the aggregate Total One inference from this analysis of bad Liabilities. We refer to this ratio as the Ag-loans is that governments should not rush to gregate Bad Loan Ratio. Although bank recapitalize banks because it is almost imloans only make up a part of the total li-possible to determine the true extent of their abilities of a firm, we assume that all liabili-bad loans while restructuring is ongoing. bad loans to firms. However, we find little and Slovak Republics resulted in a much evidence that a high debt burden hinders more concentrated ownership structure than restructuring. was originally predicted. Control of these If it does prove necessary to recapitalize firms by large strategic owners (including the banks, this should be done as part of the bank sponsored investment funds) also enprivatization process. Only then can the couraged restructuring. government be certain that the banks will Second, we show that restraining wage use these additional resources to encourage increases to a level below increases in labor restructuring rather than to incur more bad productivity allows for more restructuring. loans that may require further recapitaliza-This increases the operating cash flow of tion. The private banks can then begin to firms, which can then be used to invest in negotiate a financial restructuring of overmodernization and expansion. As in mature Rapid restructurindebted firms. Again, delay in recapitalizmarket economies, most of the capital for ing offirms will ing the banks or financially restructuring new investment must come from the internal help the banks.
over-indebted firms is not likely to slow cash flow of the firm. down the pace of operational restructuring.
Third, policies that increase bank lending to firms (for example, recapitalizing the Conclusions banks) or that forgive debts of firms may do more harm than good. The empirical analy-One of the most important policy ques-sis shows that was in the early years of tions in the transition economies is what can transition, additional bank lending was most governments do to speed up the restructuroften associated with a decline in subseing of firms and thus hasten the transition to quent firm productivity. This suggests that a mature market economy. The data that we increasing bank lending to firms or forgivhave collected on the industrial firms in ing their debts tend to reduce financial disseven countries of the region as well as case cipline and thus the incentives for restructurstudies provide some answers.
ing. Only when banking systems are suffi-First, fast privatization is instrumental in ciently reformed and market-based do we encouraging restructuring. Less important is observe a positive effect of increased bank the method of privatization. Although caselending on restructuring.
Bad loans have
by-case privatization might result in more Fourth, it may be best to delay bank re-declined in most foreign ownership, investment, and technicapitalization. One important benefit of of the countries cal assistance, our case studies of Slovak rapid restructuring is the increase in the firms suggest that this is not necessary for ability of firms to repay their bank loans and rapid restructuring. This is fortunate because other liabilities. This reduces the need for such assistance is likely to be available for the government to recapitalize the banks in only a few firms even in those countries that order to protect depositors. The safest emphasize case-by-case privatization. In course of action is to recapitalize the banks most countries, firms were primarily sold to only as part of their privatization and to domestic investors (often managers and encourage them to negotiate the financial workers) rather than foreign investors. restructuring of firms including debt for-What is needed instead is concentrated giveness only after they are privatized. ownership. Mass privatization in the Czech Annex: Estimation procedure and variables Table Al We start with a standard neo-classical production function 
Firm-specific variables:
Outputindex of total quantity of goods sold defined as the value of sales deflated by the sector-specific producer price index in local currency.
Labor inputs -average number of workers adjusted for the average number of hours worked.
Material inputs -index of total material usage defined as the value of material inputs deflated by the sectorspecific input price index in local currency.
Energy inputs -index of total energy usage defined as the value of energy inputs deflated by the aggregate energy price index in local currency.
Size -we rank all firms in a given sector by employment in the base year (1992) and then divide them into quartiles. We use dummies for each quartile. This specification proxies for market power within each sector.
Privatizationwe divide all firms into cohorts depending on the number of years since their privatization. A separate dummy is used for each cohort.
Bankfinancingchange in bank financing in the preceding year.
Timedummy variables for each year. Table A2 Firm-specific variables:
Tobin's Q -the sum of market valuation plus total debt outstanding over the firm's replacement value (net fixed assets plus inventory).
Profitabilitygross (operating) profit over net fixed assets plus inventory.
Leverageratio of assets to equity.
Dummyfor first wave -1 if the firm participated in the first wave of privatization, 0 otherwise.
Concentrationsum of shares of the top five investors, each raised to the second power.
Ownershipfor each category (bank-sponsored investment funds, local strategic investors, etc.) the cumulative share of ownership in each firm. 
